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A recent branch of the growth literature looks at the extent to which export productivity 
contributes to growth. The pioneering paper within this branch is Hausmann, Hwang 
and Rodrik (2007). In this paper, the authors construct an index of export productivity, 
defined as the income level of a country’s export basket. Using a panel of countries, 
they then analyse the determinants of this index and show that it predicts subsequent 
economic growth. This means that countries specializing in goods typically produced by 
rich countries grow faster than countries specializing in other goods.  
Focusing on a different perspective, the linkages between financial development and 
growth have been widely studied in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics. 
According to Levine (2005), financial systems foster growth as they produce ex ante 
information about possible investment; monitor investment and exert corporate 
governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, diversification and 
management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and ease the exchange of goods and 
services. A number of authors undertake cross-country empirical studies and document 
the existence of a positive link between financial development and economic growth 
(see Levine 2005 for a survey).  
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has looked at the interrelations between export 
productivity, financial development and growth. This paper bridges this gap. Using a 
panel of 139 countries over the period 1993-2003, we first focus on the determinants of 
export productivity and ask whether financial development is one of those.1 We then 
focus on the determinants of economic growth, focusing on the extent to which export 
productivity and financial development affect growth.  
Furthermore, considering that between 1992 and 2003 the southern engines of growth 
(SEG), namely China, India, Brazil and South Africa, were all characterized by 
relatively high growth rates and export productivity, we look at how the links between 
export productivity, finance and growth differ for these countries.  
China’s and India’s remarkable economic performance and their noteworthy role in the 
global economy have generated a large amount of attention and research in recent years. 
This mostly reflects their active international trade activities, which is echoed in their 
rapidly growing exports and flows of capital and investment. Particularly in China, 
exports have grown rapidly over the past twenty years. Although this expansion has 
been associated with large inflows of FDI, exports by domestic enterprises have also 
grown strongly. Other developing economies such as Brazil and South Africa are also 
major players in international markets. Although their economic performance has been 
less dramatic than China’s and India’s, they represent growth paradigms for developing 
countries in general and for their particular regions, mostly because of their significant 
trade and investment activities. For instance, the economy of Brazil outweighs that of 
all other South American countries and is expanding its presence in world markets. 
Brazil and South Africa are also closely associated with China and India through the 
trade and investment nexus and that magnifies their potential impact on developing 
countries in general and on neighbouring countries in particular. 
                                                 
1   Our 139 countries are listed in Appendix 1.  
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We find that both GDP per capita and investment generally exert a positive and 
significant effect on export productivity. Except for Brazil, financial development is not 
an important determinant of export productivity. Moreover, except for Brazil, export 
productivity plays a positive effect on growth and so does financial development for 
both China and Brazil, but not for India. Finally, in both India and Brazil, FDI is 
negatively associated with growth. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In section 2, we present a literature 
review on the links between trade specialization, productivity and growth, on the one 
hand; and finance and growth, on the other. Section 3 describes our data and presents 
some descriptive statistics. Section 4 focuses on the determinants of export productivity, 
illustrating the specifications that we estimate, our estimation methodology and our 
regression results. Section 5 focuses on the determinants of economic growth. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Literature  review 
2.1  Links between trade specialization, productivity and growth 
The relationship between trade and growth has been considered by various growth 
theories, which have particularly emphasized the linkages between trade specialization 
and growth. For instance, in the cluster of the new growth theory, Lucas (1988, 1993) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991) developed theoretical models in which countries 
that specialize in technologically progressive (high technology) activities exhibit higher 
rates of productivity growth compared to other countries. Other studies allow for 
increasing returns arising from specialization and the creation of new product varieties. 
Trade raises productivity because producers gain access to new imported varieties and 
increases in the number of varieties cut down the cost of innovation and result in even 
more variety creation (Romer 1987; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). 
In other models of growth, international trade specialization and growth are inter-related 
through endogenous technical change (Kaldor 1981; Fagerberg 1988). The pattern of 
specialization might manifest itself through the values of income and price elasticities of 
demand for a country’s exports and imports, which in turn determine a country’s growth 
performance (Thirlwall 1979).  
Understanding the determinants of export patterns and the productivity of exports is 
paramount to economic performance in general and to development economics in 
particular. For developing countries, exports are a major source of foreign exchange, a 
channel to maximize economies of scale and specialization and a channel to new 
technologies and knowledge spillovers (Lall 2000). Greenaway, Morgan and   
Wright (1999) study export-growth dynamics and demonstrate that there is not only a 
strong positive connection between exports and growth, but that the composition of 
those exports is important in determining the strength of growth.2 
                                                 
2   Also see Falvey et al. (2004) who, using firm-level data, show that exporting has a sizeable impact on 
industry productivity growth, which is independent of the links between exporting and firm 
productivity.  
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The specialization pattern and an increasing higher value added of exports have 
important implications on productivity and economic growth in developing countries. 
Existing research shows that knowledge spillovers and specialization have an effect on 
the range of goods that a country produces and exports and that this, in turn, affects 
economic growth (Amable 2000; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007; Rodrik 2006). 
This implies that a country’s pattern of specialization and exports could be as important 
as openness in fostering growth. In this regard, Fagerberg (2000) shows that countries 
that have managed to increase their presence in the technologically most progressive 
industries (e.g., electronics) have experienced higher productivity growth than other 
countries (also see Fagerberg, 1994). Malek Mansour (2003) finds that both sector 
specialization intensity and its pattern are likely to significantly affect the link between 
trade (openness) and growth. Some authors suggest that high export concentration is 
mostly determined by a dynamic growth of specialized exports, which tend to grow 
much faster than other exports (Ng and Yeats 2003). 
Michaely (1962) monitors the evolution of export diversification for products and for 
markets. He shows that a country’s specialization pattern should reflect structural 
phenomena such as factor endowments, economies of scale, relative gap of factor 
productivity, or specific advantages of firms and industries. Although their degree of 
specialization decreased marginally over the period analysed, developing countries in 
general are highly specialized in comparison to higher income (e.g., OECD) economies.  
Lall (2000) argues that East Asia (including China, which is the dominant exporter in 
the developing world) leads the developing-country sample with 70 per cent of total 
manufactured exports and its role is rising over time. In addition, Brazil, India, Mexico 
and Korea are amongst the largest developing countries exporters. He then identifies 
export sectors that promote dynamic comparative advantage, where the processes are 
classified based on technology-intensity, skills and capability-building criteria. 
Specifically, low technology products, which are characterized by least beneficial 
learning and spillover effects, tend to be associated with lower rates of growth in 
comparison to technology-intensive exports.  
Moving one step forward, Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) construct an index of 
export productivity, defined as the income level of a country’s export basket. Using a 
panel of countries, they then show that this index predicts subsequent economic growth. 
This means that countries specializing in goods typically produced by rich countries 
grow faster than countries specializing in other goods. Rodrik (2006) focuses on the 
case of China and explains its impressive growth considering that it is characterized by 
an export basket significantly more sophisticated than would be normally expected for a 
country at its income level. Xu (2006) constructs an alternative measure of China’s 
exports productivity, which takes the quality of the products into account, and finds that 
using this new measure, China’s exports productivity is not out of line with the level of 
its development. In contrast, using different measures of exports productivity, Schott 
(2006) notes that China’s exports are relatively more sophisticated than those of 
countries with similar income levels. Schott (2006) further shows that Chinese exports 
also sell at a substantial discount relative to its level of GDP and the exports originating 
from the OECD and questions whether these trends might be influenced by quality 
upgrading. 
The technological specialization of different regions varies significantly, as well as the 
specific country strategies to attain competitiveness. Export growth and competitiveness  
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have not only been based on exploiting existing advantages (i.e., natural resources and 
factors endowments), but have also been influenced by the development of capabilities 
and inflows of FDI (Lall 1996, 2000). As far as the promotion of exports is concerned, 
such schemes are used in conjunction with an ample set of trade and industrial policies 
including credit allocation and subsidies, infrastructures and development, skill 
formation, technology promotion, exchange rate adjustments, etc.3  
2.2  Links between finance and growth 
Studying the linkages between financial development and growth is a popular topic both 
in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics. According to Levine (2005), financial 
systems foster growth as they produce ex ante information about possible investment; 
monitor investment and exert corporate governance after providing finance; facilitate 
the trading, diversification and management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and ease 
the exchange of goods and services.  
The theoretical foundations of this relationship can be found in Shumpeter (1911) and, 
more recently, in McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Fry (1978, 1989), Mathieson (1980) 
and others. The main policy implication of these studies is that government restrictions 
on the banking system (such as interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements and 
directed credit programmes) may have a detrimental effect on financial development 
and, therefore, reduce economic growth. Similar conclusions are also reached by the 
endogenous growth literature, which suggests that financial intermediation has a 
positive effect on steady-state growth (Bencivenga and Smith 1991) and that 
government intervention in the financial system has a negative effect on the growth rate 
(King and Levine 1993). 
As early as 1969, Goldsmith (1969) provided the first cross-country empirical study 
documenting the existence of a link between finance and growth. A number of studies 
followed, mainly focusing on cross-country panel data and making use of several 
measures of financial development, as well as of different econometric techniques. 
These studies generally confirmed the existence of a strong positive link between the 
functioning of the financial system and growth (see Levine 2005 for a survey).  
Other authors used industry-level or firm-level data, across a broad cross-section of 
countries. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) respectively find that in countries with better functioning financial systems, 
industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance grow faster than industries 
that are not, and a larger proportion of firms grows at rates that cannot be self-financed, 
but require access to external financing. 
Finally, other papers look at the finance-growth nexus using a variety of time-series 
techniques, such as Granger causality tests and vector autoregressive procedures. Like 
the panel studies, most of these also note a positive link between various measure of 
financial development and growth (Levine 2005). 
                                                 
3  Santos-Paulino (2002) reviews trade and export promotion policies in outward oriented developing 
countries.  
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To the best of our knowledge, these two sets of literatures are largely disjoint. Our paper 
attempts to bridge the gap between them by focusing on the interrelations between 
export productivity, financial development and growth. In addition, we investigate 
whether the SEG, which are all characterized by higher than average export 
productivity, display different links between these variables than other countries. 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1  Data sources and definitions 
All our data, except the measures of export productivity and FDI stock to GDP, are 
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators 2005 and refer to the period 
1992-2003, which is the period for which we have information on exports productivity.  
Our measure of export productivity is taken from Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 
(2007).4 Specifically, EXPYit denotes the productivity level associated with country i’s 
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country j.5  
Our measure of the stock of FDI over GDP is taken from various issues of the United 
Nations’ World Investment Report.  
We focus on two main indicators of financial development. The first one is the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, where liquid liabilities consist of currency held outside the 
banking system plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries and are proxied by M3. This indicator can be seen as a measure 
of the depth of the financial system. Our second indicator of financial development is 
given by the ratio of claims on the non-financial private sector to GDP. This measure 
improves on the previous one as it excludes credit directed to the government or state-
owned enterprises. Both indicators have been widely used in the literature on financial 
development and growth (see, for instance, King and Levine 1993; Levine, Loayza and 
Beck 2000). 
                                                 
4   We thank D. Rodrik for kindly giving us access to the data that he and his co-authors constructed for 
export productivity. 
5   See Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) for details about the data they used to construct their export 
productivity measure.  
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3.2 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 1 shows median values of the main variables that we use in the remaining part of 
the paper. Column 1 refers to the full sample, column 2 to the SEG pooled together, and 
columns 3 to 6, respectively to China, India, Brazil and South Africa.6 We can see that, 
taken together, the southern engines display higher median GDP per capita growth rates 
(3.52 per cent) than the full sample (2.18 per cent). However, this conceals large 
disparities among the four SEG. Specifically, China and India display the highest 
average growth rates (8.04 per cent and 4.09 per cent, respectively), while Brazil and 
South Africa display the lowest rates (1.16 per cent and 1.73, respectively). In terms of 
real GDP per capita (measured in 2000 US dollars), taken together, the SEG display a 
lower median value than the full sample (948.2 versus 2864.6). Yet, China and India, 
which are classified as lower and low middle-income economies, display particularly 
low values of GDP per capita, namely 827.3 and 421.6, while Brazil and South Africa, 
both classified as upper middle-income countries, register very high values (3388.5 and 
3083.5, respectively). In terms of openness, which is measured as the ratio of exports to 
GDP, China and South Africa are the most open of the SEG, with median ratios of 23.1 
and 28.9, respectively. Yet, the median openness rate for the entire economy is even 
higher: 32.6. India’s and Brazil’s openness ratios, on the other hand, are respectively 
11.1 and 10.3, suggesting that these are relatively closed economies. As for export 
productivity, all SEG display values higher than the sample median (10110.5). 
Specifically, the values for China, India, Brazil and South Africa are respectively 
12818.1, 10308.4, 11679.5 and 13691.2. As noted by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 
(2007), considering the explosion in India’s software exports, India’s export 
productivity would be even higher if service exports were used in addition to 
commodity exports to compute the index. In the case of Brazil, the relatively lower level 
of export productivity might be influenced by the high ratio of resource based and 
 
Table 1 







(SEG) China  India Brazil  South  Africa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
GDP per capita  2864.57  949.18 827.35 421.64  3388.47 3083.95 
GDP per capita growth (in %) 2.18 3.52 8.04 4.09 1.16  1.73 
% of population in labour force  43.97 46.58 58.29 38.97 46.91  42.23 
Investment/GDP 21.94  21.47 33.39 22.79 19.47  15.10 
Exports/GDP 32.15  14.51  23.07 11.22 10.28  28.93 
M3/GDP 40.22  50.75  125.07 49.78 25.89  48.68 
Private credit/GDP  32.57  36.18  106.18 24.30 35.27 135.23 
Export productivity  10110.46  11685.83 12818.1  10308.38 11671.53 13691.17 
FDI flows/GDP  2.15  2.00 4.29 0.64 2.43  0.70 
FDI stock/GDP  17.60  16.50 28.25  3.43 10.40  27.26 
Notes:   Column 1 is based on 1,147 observations for 139 countries over the period 1992-2003. Column 
2 is based on 37 observations for the SEG, namely China, India, Brazil and South Africa. 
Columns 3, 4 and 5 are based on 11 observations, while column 6 is only based on 4 
observations. 
                                                 
6   Note that for South Africa, no data are available prior to 2000.  
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primary product manufactures in the country’s exports. For South Africa, export 
productivity might be upward biased by the high value of commodities such as precious 
stones (e.g., diamonds). 
Focusing on flows of FDI relative to GDP, China records a very high median value, 
namely 4.3, compared to the relatively low values of India (0.6) and South Africa (0.7), 
and to the median value of the full sample (2.1).7 In terms of FDI stock to GDP, China 
once again records the highest value among the SEG, namely 28.2, while India records 
the lowest value of 3.4. 
Looking at M3/GDP, we can see that China displays, by far, the highest value, namely 
125.1, compared to a sample median of 40.22. Brazil, on the other hand, displays a 
relatively low value: 25.7. Coming to the ratio of private credit to GDP, once again, we 
observe a wide disparity across the SEG: South Africa records the highest value (135.2), 
followed by China (106.2), Brazil (35.3) and India, which records the lowest figure 
(24.3). Considering both indicators of financial development, China seems to exhibit the 
highest levels of financial development, while Brazil records the lowest values. It 
should be noted, however, that these measures of financial development are just 
quantity indicators and do not focus on the quality of financial intermediation. If one 
were to focus on the latter, China would certainly not rank among the most financially 
developed economies. The Chinese banking system is in fact largely dominated by 
state-owned banks which tend to lend essentially to relatively inefficient state-owned 
enterprises rather than to dynamic private enterprises (Guariglia and Poncet 2006). The 
high ratios of M3 and private credit to GDP in China mainly reflect the country’s high 
level of savings, but also the relative absence of alternatives to the formal banking 
system in gathering most savings.  
All in all, we can say that, considering real per capita GDP growth, openness, FDI, and 
financial development, the SEG are quite different from each other and different from 
the average country in the sample. However, a common characteristic of these four 
countries is their export productivity, which is relatively high for all of them.  
In Table 2, we divide our observations into quartiles, based on export productivity and 
for each quartile, we focus on the medians of the main variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. We can see that higher values of export productivity are associated with higher 
values of GDP per capita. In particular, observations in the lowest export productivity 
quartile display a value of GDP per capita of 388.56, while observations in the highest 
quartile display a value of 20580. As for GDP per capita growth, the highest median 
rate (3.44 per cent) is observed in the third export productivity quartile. Investment and 
FDI variables do not seem to differ significantly across export productivity quartiles. As 
for openness, it is relatively low in the first export productivity quartile (24.23 per cent), 
but then does not differ too much in the remaining three quartiles (the values for each of 
these quartiles are respectively 35.56, 37.97 and 36.56). This suggests that a certain 
degree of openness must be achieved to ensure export productivity in the upper three 
quartiles of the distribution. Interestingly, our financial variables increase monotonically 
across export productivity quartiles. Specifically, the ratio of M3 to GDP rises from 
25.20 in the first quartile, to 41.31 in the second, 48.77 in the third and 70.93 in the 
                                                 
7   In the case of China, it should be noted that part of the FDI inflows reflect other forms of capital 
disguised as FDI to avoid capital controls (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2006).  
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fourth. Corresponding values for the ratio of private credit to GDP are 16.27, 28.68, 
37.34 and 92.22 in the last. This finding suggests that financial factors might play an 
important role as determinants of export productivity. 
Table 3 divides the sample into quartiles based on economic growth. We can see that 
GDP per capita and the ratio of investment to GDP increase monotonically, as we move 
from the first to the last quartile. Export productivity increases across the first three 
quartiles, but is lower in the highest quartile. A similar pattern is observed for the ratios 
of M3 and private credit to GDP. The ratio of exports to GDP does not change too much 
across the first three quartiles and is highest in the last one. Finally, the ratios of FDI 
flows or FDI stock to GDP do not vary too much across quartiles. 
In the next sections, we undertake a formal analysis, focusing on export productivity 
and looking first of all at its determinants, and next at the extent to which it affects 
growth. We include measures of financial development as determinants of both export 
productivity and growth and will focus both on the full sample and on whether the SEG 
exhibit a differential behaviour in terms of determinants of both export productivity and 
growth. 
Table 2 
Medians of the main variables by export productivity quartiles 
  First quartile  Second quartile Third quartile  Fourth quartile
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export productivity  5739.51 8716.35  11834.7 16027.92 
GDP per capita  367.34  1732.04  3335.28  20756.4 
GDP per capita growth (in %)  1.40  2.02  3.55  2.40 
% of population in labour force  42.59  41.02  46.49  49.16 
Investment/GDP 18.24 21.16 21.12 21.09 
Exports/GDP  23.25 34.39 35.30 37.32 
M3/GDP  24.10 39.67 44.19 69.50 
Private  credit/GDP  15.07 26.98 33.34 91.87 
FDI  flows/GDP  1.88 2.24 2.14 2.32 
FDI  stock/GDP  16.43 18.46 15.31 19.30 
Note:   This Table is based on 1,147 observations for 139 countries over the period 1992-2003. 
 
Table 3 
Medians of the main variables by growth quartiles 
  First quartile  Second quartile Third quartile  Fourth quartile
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Export productivity  8600.34 9490.93  10824.04  11500.41 
GDP  per  capita  1794.12 3046.31 3922.75 2868.97 
GDP per capita growth (in %)  -1.64  1.38  2.98  5.67 
% of population in labour force  43.44  43.21  44.07  45.15 
Investment/GDP 19.58 19.74 20.75 22.73 
Exports/GDP  31.16 29.77 31.20 38.42 
M3/GDP  35.07 41.40 48.01 39.59 
Private  credit/GDP  26.29 40.60 41.69 26.35 
FDI  flows/GDP  1.88 1.98 2.06 2.73 
FDI  stock/GDP  17.45 18.11 17.07 17.64 
Note:   As in Table 2.  
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4  What determines export productivity? 
4.1 Baseline  specifications 
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 1, we initially estimate an equation of the 
following type, aimed at analysing the determinants of export productivity: 
EXPYit = α + β1GDPPCit + β2INVit + β3LABRATIOit + β4OPENNESSit  
 +  β5FDISTOCKit + β6M3it/PRIVCREDit + ηi + λt + εit  (1) 
where i indexes countries and t, time. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
EXPY denotes export productivity;  
GDPPC, real per capita GDP (evaluated in 2000 constant US dollars);  
INV, the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio;  
LABRATIO, the proportion of the country’s population who is in the labour force; 
OPENNESS, the ratio of exports to GDP;  
FDISTOCK, the ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP;  
PRIVCRED, the ratio of private credit to GDP; and M3, the ratio of M3 to GDP.8 
Country fixed effects and time fixed effects are denoted by ηi and λt respectively and, εit 
is an idiosyncratic error term. We take into account the time fixed effects by including 
time dummies in all our specifications. 
We then focus on the extent to which the estimated coefficients differ for the SEG 
compared to the other countries in the sample. In order to do so, we estimate an 
Equation of the following type: 
EXPYit = α + β11GDPPCit + β12GDPPCit*SEG + β21INVit + β22INVit*SEG  
 + β31LABRATIOit +β32LABRATIOit*SEG+ β41OPENNESSit  
 + β42OPENNESSit*SEG+ +β51FDISTOCKit + β51FDISTOCKit*SEG  
 + β61 M3it/PRIVCREDit+ β62 M3it/PRIVCREDit*SEG + ηi + λt + εit  (2)  
 
where SEG denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 in turn for China, India and Brazil and 
0 otherwise.9 Focusing for instance on the effects of PRIVCRED on EXPY,  β61 
                                                 
8  Our results were generally robust to using lagged instead of contemporaneous values of all the right-
hand side variables. They were also robust to including the FDI flows to GDP ratio, instead of the FDI 
stock to GDP ratio among the regressors.  
9  Although South Africa is also a SEG, we were unable to include it in our regression analysis as export 
productivity is only available after 2000 for this country.  
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measures the average impact for the full sample of countries, while the impact for the 
SEG is measured by (β61 + β62). β62 measures therefore the incremental impact observed 
for the SEG.10 
4.2 Estimation  methodology 
Equations (1) and (2) confront us with some econometric issues. First, given the 
presence of the country fixed effects, OLS estimates would be biased and inconsistent. 
One could use a within-groups estimator instead. Yet, in all specifications, most of the 
explanatory variables are likely to be endogenously determined and the within-groups 
estimator does not take that into account. We therefore use the system 
generalized  method  of  moments (GMM) panel estimator, proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).11 The GMM system estimator relies on a 
system combining the estimating equation in levels and in first-differences. First-
differencing allows to control for the fixed effects. In order to control for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors, once lagged first-differences of the regressors are used as 
instruments in the level equation and twice or more lagged levels of the regressors are 
used as instruments in the first-differenced equation. The inclusion of the regression in 
levels in addition to that in first-differences helps to cope with weak-instrument 
biases.12 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that εit 
does not display serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. We use two 
tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for these assumptions: the J statistic 
and the test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals (m2). The former is the 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a chi-square 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of 
parameters, under the null of instrument validity.13 The m2 test is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation and 
provides a further check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of 
variables dated t-2 as instruments. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests 
gives support to our model. 
                                                 
10 Our results were generally robust to also including the SEG dummy variable on its own among the 
regressors. Yet, this variable was generally poorly determined. For this reason, we do not include it in 
our tables. 
11  See Beck, Levine and Loayza. (2000) for a complete discussion of the advantages and limitations of 
GMM estimators. 
12    Specifically, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the instruments used with the standard first-
differenced GMM estimator (i.e., the endogenous variables lagged two or more periods) become less 
informative in autoregressive models with persistent series, and in models where the variance of the 
fixed effects is particularly high relative to the variance of the transitory shocks. All our results were 
robust to using the simple first-difference GMM estimator rather than the system-GMM.  
13 It should be noted that when panels with a short cross-sectional dimension are used, the Sargan test 
has low power.  
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4.3 Regression  results 
Our regression results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The former includes the ratio of 
M3 to GDP, and the latter, the ratio of private credit to GDP. In both Tables, column 1 
reports the estimates of Equation (1) and column 2 to 4, those of Equation (2), which 
focuses on the extent to which the estimated coefficients differ for each of the SEG 
compared to the other countries in the sample. Looking at column 1, we can see that 
GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, the proportion of the country’s population 
who is in the labour force and trade openness exert a positive impact on export 
productivity. The stock of FDI to GDP exerts a negative effect on export productivity, 
which is, however, marginally significant. Yet, both the ratio of M3 to GDP and the 
ratio of private credit to GDP, display insignificant coefficients. Looking at the entire 
sample, it seems therefore that finance is not related to export productivity.  
Focusing now on column 2 of both Tables, which assesses the extent to which the effect 
of the regressors on export productivity differs for China compared to the other 
countries in the sample, we can see that only two variables exert a different effect on the 
export productivity of China, compared to that of the other countries: the proportion of 
the population in the labour force and the degree of openness. For China, the overall 
impact of the former variable on export productivity is given by β31 + β32, which, 
considering that β32 is negative and larger in absolute value than β31, is negative. This 
effect can be explained considering that export productivity in China is not linked to 
labour-intensive products. Similarly, the degree of openness plays a negative impact on 
China’s export productivity, while exerting a positive impact on that of the other 
countries. This differential effect could be explained considering that China exports a 
number of labour-intensive and low technology manufactures, which do not contribute 
to improving export productivity. Like for the full sample, financial variables do not 
affect export productivity in China. 
Column 3 of Tables 4 and 5 assesses whether the effects of our regressors on export 
productivity are different for our second SEG, India. With reference to what determines 
its export productivity, this country does not seem to differ significantly from the other 
countries in our sample. In fact, in Table 4, we can see that the only regressor interacted 
with the India dummy, which is statistically significant is OPENNESS. Like in the case 
of China, the effect of OPENNESS on export productivity appears to be negative for 
India, while it is positive for the other countries. Like for China, this can be due to the 
fact that India also exports numerous labour-intensive, low productivity goods. This 
effect is however weaker than the corresponding effect for China, as it disappears in 
Table 5. Table 5, on the other hand, shows that in the case of India, the investment to 
GDP ratio affects export productivity growth negatively. This effect is marginally 
significant and is not observed in Table 4. It could be explained by overinvestment in 
low-tech sectors. Financial variables do not affect India’s export productivity. 
Column 4 of Tables 4 and 5 refers to Brazil. Interestingly, we can observe that contrary 
to the other SEG analysed so far, both M3 and PRIVCRED exert a positive effect on 
export productivity in Brazil. This can be due to the fact that the financial system is 
more efficient in Brazil and helps channelling resources towards productive export-
oriented sectors. Furthermore, unlike China and India, the stock of FDI to GDP also 
exerts a positive effect on export productivity in Brazil: it is possible that it is the highly 
productive multinationals that make up the bulk of exports in the country. Yet, like in  
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the case of China and India, the degree of openness is negatively associated with export 
productivity, possibly for the same reasons discussed for the other SEG. 
In summary, China, India and Brazil appear to be different from the other countries in 
our sample, not only because they are characterized by higher growth rates (in the cases 
of China and India) and high export productivity, but also because, contrary to the other 
countries, openness is systematically negatively associated with their export 
productivity. In terms of financial variables, a link with export development only 
appears for Brazil. Both for the full sample and the SEG, the driving forces of export 
productivity appear to be GDP per capita and the investment to GDP ratio. We now turn 
to analyse the extent to which export productivity and other variables, including our 
indicators of financial development, affect economic growth. 
Table 4 
Determinants of export productivity (including M3) 
    SEG = China  SEG = India  SEG = Brazil 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




















































































m2  -1.02 -1.00 -1.00  -1.05 
Sargan (p-value)  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.999 
No. of observations  1036  1036  1036  1036 
Note:   All variables are expressed in logarithms. GDPPC denotes real per capita GDP (evaluated in 
2000 constant US dollars); INV, the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio; LABRATIO, the 
proportion of the country’s population who is in the labour force; OPENNESS, the ratio of exports 
to  GDP; FDISTOCK, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP;  and  M3, the ratio of M3 to GDP. SEG 
denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 in turn for China, India and Brazil and 0 otherwise. All 
regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The sample used in estimation 
consists of 124 countries between 1992 and 2003. All right hand-side variables were 
instrumented using two or more lags of themselves in the first-differenced equation and their 
first-difference lagged once in the levels equation. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. m2 is a test for second- order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Determinants of export productivity (including PRIVCRED) 
    SEG = China  SEG = India  SEG = Brazil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















































































m2  -0.66 -0.62 -0.65 -0.69 
Sargan  (p-value)  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
No. of observations  1134  1134  1134  1134 
Note:  All variables are expressed in logarithms. GDPPC denotes real per capita GDP (evaluated in 
2000 constant US dollars); INV, the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio; LABRATIO, the 
proportion of the country’s population who is in the labour force; OPENNESS, the ratio of exports 
to GDP; FDISTOCK, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP; and PRIVCRED, the ratio of private credit to 
GDP.  SEG denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 in turn for China, India and Brazil and 0 
otherwise. All regressions were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The sample used in 
estimation consists of 132 countries between 1992 and 2003. All right hand-side variables were 
instrumented using two or more lags of themselves in the first-differenced equation and their 
first-difference lagged once in the levels equation. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second- order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
5 Exports  productivity,  financial  development and economic growth 
5.1 Baseline  specification 
We next estimate an equation for the determinants of countries’ economic growth, 
augmented with exports productivity and financial development indicators. This 
equation takes the following form: 
ΔGDPPCit =  α + β1GDPPCi(t-1) + β2EXPYit + β3INVit + β4LABRATIOit  
 +  β5OPENNESSit + β6M3it/PRIVCREDit +β7FDIit+ ηi + λt + εit  (3)   
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where ΔGDPPC indicates real GDP per capita growth; and FDI indicates the ratio of 
FDI flows to GDP.14 Lagged per capita GDP is included to control for convergence.15 
In this type of specification, introducing the lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors together with fixed country effects renders the within-groups estimator biased 
and inconsistent even if εit is not serially correlated. This happens because the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term.16 Also considering the econometric 
problems highlighted in section 4.2, once again, we use the GMM-system estimator. 
In order to gauge the incremental effect that the various regressors have on the 
economic growth of the SEG, we estimate the following equation:17 
ΔGDPPCit = α + β11GDPPCi(t-1) + β12GDPPCi(t-1)*SEG   
 +  β21EXPYit + β22EXPYit*SEG + β31INVit + β32INVit*SEG   
 +  β41LABRATIOit + β42LABRATIOit *SEG 
 +  β51OPENNESSit + β52OPENNESSit*SEG  
 +  β61M3it/PRIVCREDit + β62(M3it/PRIVCREDit)*SEG  
 +  β71FDIit+ β72FDIit*SEG + ηi + λt + εit   (4)  
5.2 Regression  results 
Tables 6 and 7 report the estimates of Equations (3) and (4), when M3it is used as our 
measure of financial development and when PRIVCREDit is used, respectively. Column 
1 of both tables reports the estimates of Equation (3) and column 2 to 4, those of 
Equation (4), which focuses on the extent to which the estimated coefficients differ for 
each of the SEG compared to the other countries in the sample. From column 1 of 
Table  6, we can see that the coefficient associated with lagged GDP per capita is 
negative but insignificant: there is therefore no evidence of convergence. This could be 
due to the short time dimension of our panel. Table 7, however, shows a small evidence 
of convergence. In both tables, exports productivity is positively related to growth, 
                                                 
14 While we included the ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP in the regressions for export productivity, we 
include FDI flows relative to GDP in our GDP growth regressions. This choice is motivated by our 
belief that export productivity is more likely to be affected by the overall FDI presence in each 
country, while GDP growth is more likely to be affected by the FDI flowing in each country in each 
year, through technological spillovers (De Mello 1999). 
15 Our results were robust to the inclusion of additional regressors such as inflation, the ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP, or the percentage of population with secondary education. However, 
since these variables were missing for a large number of observations, we decided to omit them from 
our chosen specification. Our results were also robust to using lagged instead of contemporaneous 
values of the regressors. 
16  This bias is generally referred to as the Nickell (1981) bias. Nickell (1981) derives a formula for this 
bias (when there are no exogenous regressors), showing that it approaches 0 as the sample size tends 
to infinity. The within-groups estimator is thus likely to perform well only when the time dimension 
of the panel is large. 
17 Once again, our results were generally robust to also including the SEG dummy variable on its own 
among the regressors. Yet, this variable was generally poorly determined. For this reason, we do not 
include it in our tables.  
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which confirms the findings in Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007). The investment 
to GDP ratio and the ratio of the labour force to the total population are also positively 
associated with growth. Table 6 shows a small positive effect of FDI flows on growth, 
and Table 7, a small negative effect of openness on growth. Both the financial variables 
display insignificant coefficients, indicating that financial development does not affect 
the GDP growth of our sample of countries. We now focus on whether these patterns 
also hold for the SEG. 
Table 6 
Export productivity and growth (including M3) 
    SEG = China  SEG = India  SEG = Brazil 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 


































































































m2  0.84 0.83  0.84  0.83 
Sargan (p-value)  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
No. of observations  962  962  962  962 
Note:   The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
GDPPC denotes real per capita GDP (evaluated in 2000 constant US dollars); EXPY, export 
productivity; INV, the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio; LABRATIO, the proportion of the 
country’s population who is in the labour force; OPENNESS, the ratio of exports to GDP; FDI, 
the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; and M3, the ratio of M3 to GDP. SEG denotes a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in turn for China, India and Brazil and 0 otherwise. All regressions were estimated 
using a system-GMM  estimator. The sample used in estimation consists of 123 countries 
between 1993 and 2003. All right hand-side variables were instrumented using two or more lags 
of themselves in the first-differenced equation and their first-difference lagged once in the levels 
equation. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  m2 is a test for second- order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan 
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Export productivity and growth (including PRIVCRED) 
    SEG = China  SEG = India  SEG = Brazil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 


































































































m2  0.91 0.90 0.91 0.89 
Sargan (p-value)  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
No. of observations  1063  1063  1063  1o63 
Note:   The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
GDPPC denotes real per capita GDP (evaluated in 2000 constant US dollars); EXPY, export 
productivity; INV, the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio; LABRATIO, the proportion of the 
country’s population who is in the labour force; OPENNESS, the ratio of exports to GDP; FDI, 
the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; and PRIVCRED, the ratio of private credit to GDP. SEG denotes a 
dummy variable equal to 1 in turn for China, India and Brazil and 0 otherwise. All regressions 
were estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The sample used in estimation consists of 133 
countries between 1993 and 2003. All right hand-side variables were instrumented using two or 
more lags of themselves in the first-differenced equation and their first-difference lagged once in 
the levels equation. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) are asymptotically robust 
to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second- order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan 
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Column 2 in both tables focuses on China. Both tables show a much stronger evidence 
of convergence for China, which can be explained by the very strong growth rates 
experienced by this country, which started off with a very low level of GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, export productivity seems to play a much stronger effect on growth in 
China, compared to the other countries in our sample, suggesting that the very strong  
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growth that characterized the country in recent years was pretty much export-led. 
Although it affects export productivity negatively, the percentage of population in the 
labour force has a stronger effect on Chinese growth compared to other countries, 
suggesting that the production of labour-intensive goods exerts a positive effect on 
growth. Finally, in the case of China, both financial variables positively affect growth. 
This indicates that in spite of an inefficient financial system (Allen, Qian and 
Qian 2005), the sheer volume of financial resources available is positively associated 
with growth.18 
Coming to India, column 3 of Tables 6 and 7 shows that there is no evidence of 
convergence. Like in the case of China, export productivity affects growth more in India 
than in the average country making up our sample. Yet, this effect does not appear in 
Table 6. Furthermore, investment exerts a particularly strong positive effect on growth 
in India. Surprisingly, contrary to the other countries in the sample, openness, FDI, as 
well as private credit, are negatively associated with Indian growth. It could be that 
multinationals operating in India are mainly oriented at exporting their products, 
without benefiting the local economy. As for private credit, its negative association with 
growth could be a consequence of the small size of this variable (24.3 compared to an 
average for the entire sample of 32.6).19  
Coming to Brazil, column 4 of Tables 6 and 7 show no evidence of convergence. 
Moreover, surprisingly, in the Brazilian case, export productivity seems to be negatively 
(Table 6) or insignificantly (Table 7) linked with growth. Considering that Brazil is 
highly specialized and has a strong comparative advantage in resource-based low tech 
manufactures, the sophistication of exports does not seem to be a driving force in the 
economy. Like in the case of India, investment exerts a particularly strong effect on 
growth in Brazil and FDI, a negative (although much smaller) effect. Contrary to India 
and China, however, the proportion of the population in the labour force is negatively 
associated with Brazilian growth and openness is positively related with it. Finally, like 
in China, but contrary to India, M3 and growth are positively related in Brazil. 
In summary, the determinants of growth seem to be particularly heterogeneous, not only 
across countries, but also across SEG. Variables such as export productivity and 
financial development indicators seem to positively affect growth in some countries and 
to negatively affect it in others. Only the investment to GDP ratio seems to be 
unambiguously positively associated with growth. This suggests that policymakers who 
aim at promoting growth in a country should not necessarily focus on other countries’ 
experiences to inform their policies.  
 
 
                                                 
18 This finding contradicts Guariglia and Poncet (2006), who, using data for 30 Chinese provinces over 
the period 1989-2003 found a negative association between financial development and growth. This 
difference between our results and theirs may be due to an aggregation bias. 
19 Allen at al. (2006) document that both India’s stock market and banking sector are small relative to 
the size of its economy, and that the financial system is dominated by an efficient, but under-utilized, 
in terms of lending to non-state sectors, banking sector.   
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6 Conclusions 
Using a panel of 139 countries over the period 1992-2003, we have analysed the links 
between export productivity, economic growth and financial development indicators. 
We have also investigated whether the links observed in China, India and Brazil 
systematically differ from those observed in other countries in the sample. We have 
found that per capita GDP and investment generally exert a strong effect on export 
productivity. Moreover, only for Brazil, indicators of financial development also 
strongly affect export productivity. In line with Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007), 
we have also found that, except for Brazil, export productivity generally plays a strong 
effect on growth. The results highlight the importance of not just the volume of exports 
on a country’s growth and productivity, but the type of specialization patterns, which 
seem to be favoured by products with higher value-added and more technologically 
developed products. On the other hand, FDI flows generally do not affect growth and 
actually affect it negatively in both India and Brazil. Finally, M3 affects China’s and 
Brazil’s growth positively and significantly; and private credit affects China’s growth 
positively, but Indian’s growth, negatively.  
Our analysis suggests that there exists considerable heterogeneity across countries, in 
terms of the links between export specialization, financial development and growth. In 
order to device policies aimed at promoting growth, the individual characteristics of 
each country should therefore be carefully considered, as the effects of a given variable 
on growth may be positive for one country and negative for another. More work needs 
to be undertaken, possibly at the firm-level, within each county of interest, to 
understand the dynamics between export productivity, finance and growth within each 
of the four SEG.  
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3. Argentina   
4. Armenia   
5. Australia 
6. Austria   
7. Azerbaijan   
8. Bahrain   
9. Bangladesh   
10. Belarus   
11. Belgium 
12. Belize   
13. Benin   
14. Bolivia   
15. Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  
16. Botswana   
17.  Brazil  
18. Bulgaria   
19.  Burkina Faso  
20. Burundi   
21. Cameroon   
22. Canada   
23.  Cape Verde  
24. Central  African 
Republic  
25. Chile   
26.  China  
27. Colombia   
28. Comoros   
29.  Congo, Rep.  
30.  Costa Rica  
31.  Cote d'Ivoire  
32. Croatia   
33. Cyprus   
34.  Czech Rep.  
35. Denmark   
36.  Dominican Rep.  
37. Ecuador   
38.  Egypt, Arab Rep.  
39.  El Salvador  
40. Estonia   
41. Ethiopia  (ex. 
Eritrea)  
42. Fiji   
43. Finland   
44. France   
45. Gabon   
46. Gambia,  The 
 
47. Georgia   
48. Germany   
49. Ghana   
50. Greece   
51. Guatemala   
52. Guinea   
53. Guyana   
54. Haiti   
55. Honduras   
56.  Hong Kong, China  
57. Hungary   
58. Iceland   
59.  India  
60. Indonesia 
61.  Iran, Islamic Rep.  
62. Ireland 
63. Israel   
64. Italy   
65. Jamaica   
66. Japan   
67. Jordan   
68. Kazakhstan   
69. Kenya   
70.  Korea, Rep.  
71.  Kyrgyz Rep.  
72. Latvia   
73. Lebanon   
74. Lesotho   
75. Lithuania   
76. Luxembourg   
77. Macao   
78.  Macedonia, FYR  
79. Madagascar   
80. Malawi   
81. Malaysia   
82. Mali   
83. Malta   
84. Mauritius   
85. Mexico   
86. Moldova   
87. Mongolia   
88. Morocco   
89. Mozambique   
90. Namibia   
91. Nepal   
92. Netherlands   
93.  New Zealand  
94. Nicaragua   
95. Niger   
96. Nigeria   
97. Norway   
98. Oman 
99. Pakistan   
100. Panama   
101.  Papua New Guinea  
102. Paraguay   
103. Peru   
104. Philippines 
105. Poland   
106. Portugal   
107. Romania   
108.  Russian Federation  
109. Rwanda   
110.  Saudi Arabia  
111. Senegal   
112.  Sierra Leone  
113. Slovak  Rep. 
114. Slovenia   
115.  South Africa  
116. Spain   
117.  Sri Lanka  
118.  St Lucia  
119.  St Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
120. Sudan   
121. Swaziland   
122. Sweden   
123. Switzerland   
124.  Syrian Arab Rep. 
125. Tanzania 
126. Thailand   
127. Togo   
128.  Trinidad and Tobago  
129. Turkey   
130. Turkmenistan   
131. Uganda   
132. Ukraine   
133.  United Kingdom  
134.  United States  
135. Uruguay 
136. Vanuatu   
137. Venezuela   
138. Zambia   
139. Zimbabwe   